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ETHICAL PROBLEMS FOR THE LAW FIRM OF A
FORMER GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY: FIRM OR
INDIVIDUAL DISQUALIFICATION?
Canon 9 of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional
Responsibility states that "[a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of
professional impropriety."' Over the past year, substantial disagreement
has developed over whether an appearance of impropriety exists when a law
firm accepts a case for which one of its members had substantial responsibil-
ity while in government employment. This situation may arise frequently in
either of two basic situations. In the first, a young lawyer accepts employ-
ment with a federal agency such as the Justice Department or the Securities
and Exchange Commission, works there for a few years, and then enters
private practice with a firm where the expertise gained in government
service will be of value.2 In the second, an attorney attains prominence in
private practice and is then chosen for a leadership position as a cabinet
officer, sub-cabinet official or with an administrative agency. After serving
in this capacity for a time, the lawyer then returns to private practice.' In
both situations, a problem arises if a matter handled by the lawyer while in
government service comes to the firm which he has joined.
One approach to such a case, advocated by some members of the Ethics
Committee of the District of Columbia Bar Association and recently rejected
by the whole Committee, would require the law firm as a whole to refuse to
handle the matter.4 A second approach, formulated in the American Bar
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Inquiry 19 was drafted by members of the District of Columbia Ethics Committee, chaired
by then Dean Monroe H. Freedman of Hofstra University School of Law. When the Inquiry
came up for a final vote it received a majority of the votes cast, but failed to receive final
approval due to three abstentions which prevented obtaining the votes of a majority of all
Committee members as required by Committee rules for decisions of such importance. Letter
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Association's Opinion 342, would allow the firm to take the case only so
long as the former government attorney were excluded from participation in
the matter and would receive no part of the fee charged by the firm.5 The
procedure in this second approach is commonly known as "screening."
The government lawyer's entry or reentry into private practice presents
a significant question of legal ethics and an issue of great practical import-
ance to many attorneys, law firms and government agencies. 6 This Note will
examine and analyze the differing approaches to this issue and will suggest
one solution to the problem. It should be stated at the outset that this Note,
like the various ethics opinions it discusses, assumes that the former govern-
ment attorney himself is disqualified from a case in which he has partici-
pated by Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility;7 the only question that requires analysis is whether the partners and
from Monroe H. Freedman to All Interested People (Dec. 8, 1976). An approach somewhat
similar to that of Inquiry 19 was adopted by the Ethics Committees of the Bar Association of
Montgomery County, Maryland, and of the Maryland State Bar Association. MONTGOMERY
COUNTY BAR Ass'N COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 19 (June 21, 1976); MD.
STATE BAR ASS'N COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Docket 77-10 (July 26, 1976).
After the defeat of Inquiry 19 the D.C. Ethics Committee formulated amendments to
Canon 9. These amendments would apply to all lawyers practicing in the District of Columbia
and might have persuasive effect elsewhere. Professor Freedman feels there are sufficient
votes to adopt these amendments in Committee. Letter from Monroe H. Freedman to All
Interested People, supra. If so, its action must be approved by the Governing Board of the
District of Columbia Bar Association, which must then recommend the amendments to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Id.
The somewhat convoluted history of Inquiry 19 is summarized in Lawscope, Conflict of
Interest: The Debate Heats Up, 63 A.B.A. J. 16 (1977). Mssrs. Freedman and Cutler present
their views on Inquiry 19 in Legal Ethics Forum, Conflict of Interests and the Government
Lawyer, 63 A.B.A. J. 724 (1977).
5. A similar approach was taken in N.Y. CITY BAR ASs'N COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL AND
JUDICIAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 889 (Dec. 5, 1976), reported in 45 U.S.L.W. 2292 (Dec. 14,
1976).
6. A substantial number of attorneys enter government service each year, either directly
from law school or after some years of private practice, with the intention of entering or
reentering private practice after a few years with the government. See notes 44-45 infra and
accompanying text.
7. The disqualification of the former government attorney himself is often a complicated
issue. See, e.g., Opinion 342; D.C. COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 16 (1975),
reported in DISTRICT LAWYER 43-44 (Fall 1976); Note, Attorney's Conflict of Interests: Repre-
sentation of Interest Adverse to That of Former Client, 55 B.U. L. REV. 61 (1975); Note,
Disqualification of Counsel for the Appearance of Professional Impropriety, 25 CATH. U.L.
REV. 343 (1976); Note, Ethical Considerations When an Attorney Opposes a Former Client: The
Need for a Realistic Application of Canon Nine, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 525 (1975). Prior to the
1969 adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the relevant rule in this area was
Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, which stated in part that: "A lawyer, having
once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement
accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon
while in such office or employ." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 36 (1967). See
Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 HARV.
L. REV. 657 (1957); Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and
Intra-Firm Conflicts of Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058 (1964).
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associates in his law firm should be disqualified as well.8
OPINION 342 AND INQUIRY 19
Both approaches to the problem of firm disqualification-total disqual-
ification and screening-are based on the concerns which underlie disqual-
ification of the former government lawyer himself. These are described by
the ABA as:
the prevention of the apparent treachery of switching sides; the safe-
guarding of confidential governmental information from future use
against the government; the need to discourage government lawyers
from handling particular assignments in such a way as to encourage
their own future employment in regard to those particular matters after
leaving government service; and the professional benefit derived from
avoiding the appearance of evil. 9
Balanced against these policies are the government's interest in recruitment
of well-qualified attorneys and the danger that such recruitment will be
impaired if potential government attorneys fear restrictions on their future
practice, the perceived unfairness involved in imposing stringent restraints
on the careers of government employees, and the notion that great "sac-
rifices" should not be asked of lawyers entering public service. 10 In addi-
tion, disqualification serves no valid purpose if its sole effect is to interfere
with choice of counsel or to deprive a litigant of competent counsel in
particularly complex areas of the law where special technical training and
experience are invaluable. "
Today, the problem is governed by Canon 9, Ethical Consideration (E.C.) 9-2, and Discipli-
nary Rule (D.R.) 9-101(B). ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, E.C. 9-3 (1975) states
that: "After a lawyer leaves judicial office or other public employment, he should not accept
employment in connection with any matter in which he had substantial responsibility prior to
his leaving, since to accept employment would give the appearance of impropriety even if none
exists." D.R. 9-101(B) says that "[a] lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in
which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee." The Preliminary
Statement to the Code points out that only the Disciplinary Rules are mandatory in character,
describing "the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject
to disciplinary action." Id., Preliminary Statement. The Canons and Ethical Considerations
provide norms and objectives for which the profession should aim. Id.
For an SEC rule even stricter than D.R. 9-101(B), see 17 C.F.R. § 200.735-8 (1976),
discussed at note 47 infra.
8. Both Inquiry 19 and Opinion 342 agree that such an exclusion should not extend to a
government agency when one of its attorneys has gone from private practice to the agency. As
Opinion 342 states, an entire government agency cannot be forbidden from handling a matter
just because one member of the agency staff dealt with the same case while in private practice.
Such a result would unduly hamper the ability of the government to function. Opinion 342 at
521.
9. Opinion 342 at 518. See also note 24 infra.
10. Opinion 342 at 518.
11. Id. at 518-19. The validity of these points is underscored by the Fifth Circuit's recent
opinion in Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976), dealing with the
disqualification of a former government attorney under D.R. 9-101(B). The Fifth Circuit found
that "Canon 9 does not require the disqualification of every attorney who has been privately
[Vol. 1977:512
ETHICAL PROBLEMS
While agreeing that the former government attorney himself must be
disqualified notwithstanding the factors weighing against his disqualifica-
tion, 12 the American Bar Association's Opinion 342 and the District of
Columbia's Inquiry 19 diverge in the application of these policies to an
entire firm. Their starting point is of necessity the language of Disciplinary
Rule 5-105(D): "If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to
withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, as-
sociate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or
continue such employment.' 13 On its face, this rule appears to be abso-
lute, 14 extending to the entire firm of the former government attorney.15 The
ABA, however, tempers this language by adopting a balancing approach. In
retained in a matter for which he had substantial responsibility while associated with the
Government." Id. at 812. It pointed to "important social interests" similar to those recognized
in Opinion 342, "including the client's right to counsel of his choice, the lawyer's right to freely
practice his profession, and the government's need to attract skilled lawyers." Id. The court
further noted that:
Inasmuch as attorneys now commonly use disqualification motions for purely
strategic purposes, such an extreme approach would often unfairly deny a litigant the
counsel of his choosing. Indeed, the more frequently a litigant is delayed or otherwise
disadvantaged by the unnecessary disqualification of his lawyer under the appear-
ance of impropriety doctrine, the greater the likelihood of public suspicion of both
the law and the judiciary. An overly broad application of Canon 9, then, would be
ultimately self-defeating.
Id. at 813.
12. Opinion 342 at 521; Inquiry 19 at 15-16.
13. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, D.R. 5-105(D) (1975).
14. The remaining sections of the rule, D.R. 5-105(A)-(C), which govern other conflict of
interest situations, first state an absolute rule and then permit its avoidance when the informed
consent of the client is obtained. One of the arguments advanced in Opinion 342 is that since the
Code drafters permitted waiver of D.R. 5-105(A) through (C), they must also have intended to
permit waiver of the protections of D.R. 5-105(D) as extended to D.R. 9-101(B) disqualifica-
tions. Opinion 342 at 521. Contrast note 26 infra.
15. Both Opinion 342 and Inquiry 19 point out that disqualification of the entire firm is the
general rule when one member of the firm is disqualified. Opinion 342 at 517 n.2; Inquiry 19 at
4. The issue under discussion is whether the rule should extend to the firm of the former
government attorney; the general rule as applied to movement entirely within the private sector
is unquestioned. Inquiry 19 argues that Congress relied on this rule in enacting the Federal
Conflict of Interest Law, 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1970), which controls the private employment of
former government employees but fails to provide for partners and associates. The Inquiry
explains this omission by referring to the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, S. REP. No. 2213,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1962), which stated that this was a question of legal ethics in which the
criminal law should not intervene. The Senate thus omitted a House provision which made it a
federal crime for a partner or associate to act when the. former government attorney was
himself disqualified. The Inquiry then refers to an "apparent oversight" when the Code of
Professional Responsibility failed to state whether a D.R. 9-101(B) disqualification would bar
partners and associates as well, pointing fo D.R. 5-105(D) as a rectification of this oversight.
Inquiry 19 at 4-6.
In a letter to the D.C. Ethics Committee, Antonin Scalia, the Assistant Attorney General
for the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, argued that Congress' failure to extend
the law to partners and associates stemmed from a fear of adverse effect on the "government's
ability to attract outstanding attorneys." Scalia Letter at 3.
An excellent analysis of the Senate Hearings on the Conflict of Interest Law may be found
in Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Thmes, supra note 7, at 1064-66.
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order that the needs of the government and its employees will not be
sacrificed unnecessarily, 16 the potential benefits to the profession and the
public of a strict rule of disqualification are balanced against the restrictive
effects flowing from an absolute approach. 17 The result is a screening
procedure whereby:
D.R. 5-105(D) applies to the firm and partners and associates of a
disqualified lawyer who has not been screened, to the satisfaction of
the government agency concerned, from participation in the work and
compensation of the firm on any matter over which as a public emp-
loyee he had substantial responsibility. 8
THE ABA Ethics Committee feels that this limited application of D.R.
5-105(D), allowing the government agency to waive its protection, will
accomplish the goal of destroying the incentive for the government lawyer
to handle his work so as to affect his future employment opportunities.
According to the Committee, "[o]nly allegiance to form over substance
would justify blanket application of D.R. 5-105(D) in a manner that thwarts
and distorts the policy considerations behind [the] D.R. 9-101(B)" require-
ment of individual disqualification. 19 The ABA does not indicate how this
16. Opinion 342 at 520-21.
17. This approach is similar to that taken in Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d
804 (5th Cir. 1976), discussed note 11 supra, in which the court stated that it must be
"conscious of its responsibility to preserve a reasonable balance between the need to ensure
ethical conduct on the part of lawyers appearing before it and other social interests, which
include the litigant's right to freely chosen counsel." Id. at 810.
18. Opinion 342 at 521.
19. Id.
Screening procedures are already followed by several government agencies including the
Department of Justice, the Internal Revenue Service, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Maritime Commission. In a letter to the
D.C. Ethics Committee, Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia described the screening
safeguards required by the Department of Justice. These safeguards include: (1) an understand-
ing with the disqualified lawyer and his firm that he will have no personal involvement with the
case and will not discuss it within the firm; (2) reasonable certainty that such an understanding
could be upheld after the size of the firm and the competence of other firm members to handle
the matter are considered; (3) a general requirement that the representation predate the hiring of
the disqualified attorney in order to eliminate any suggestion that the firm was hired for the case
because of the attorney's presence therein; (4) an undertaking that the disqualified lawyer will
not share in the fees generated by the case; and (5) full disclosure of the situation to the tribunal
or agency before which the matter is pending. Scalia Letter at 1.
See also 16 C.F.R. §4.1(b)(4) (1976) (Federal Trade Commission); 46 C.F.R. § 502.32(c)
(1975) (Maritime Commission); Pitt Letter (SEC considers such factors as the size of the law
firm which requests screening and whether it practiced securities law before the disqualified
lawyer joined it, id. at 7; see note 74 infra and accompanying text). See note 60 infra for a
discussion of the Internal Revenue Service approach. These examples indicate that screening
has been an accepted way to avoid the strict application of D.R. 5-105(D) when it is triggered by
the application of D.R. 9-101(B). But see note 37 infra for a critique of the screening approach.
A modified version of screening has been adopted by the New York City Bar Association
Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics. N.Y. CITY BAR Ass'N COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL
AND JUDICIAL ETHICS. OPINIONS, No. 889, supra note 6. The New York view differs from that
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screening will reduce the public perception of impropriety, an important
problem which both D.R. 9-101(B) and Canon 9 seek to remedy.2'
The focus of Inquiry 19 is altogether different. Great emphasis is
placed on the policy of avoiding the appearance of impropriety.21 Inquiry
19's approach is designed to prevent conduct which may lead to an in-
ference-whether justified or not-that a public official was influenced by
the hope that he would obtain future legal employment in the private sector
22
or that private parties are deriving an unfair benefit from the expertise and
relationships developed by a lawyer while in public service.23 The end
product of this focus is the conclusion that the policies behind attorney
disqualification can only be protected by absolute disqualification of the
firm as wel124-- that is, by a literal reading of Rule 5-105(D). Screening is
proposed by Opinion 342 in that the government agency is not the sole party which decides
whether screening is adequate. The New York Opinion states that:
in a litigated matter or similar proceeding, to vest in the governmental agency
absolute discretion to compel disqualification by refusing to give a requisite waiver or
consent in many cases would effectively compel the refusal of such conduct out of an
understandable fear on the part of Government counsel that should the case be lost,
he would be subject to criticism and even possible discipline for failure to take
advantage of that veto power.
45 U.S.L.W. at 2292. Thus, New York City favors a more liberal type of screening with the
government agency lacking the veto power apparently given it by Opinion 342.
20. While Opinion 342 lists the appearance of impropriety as one policy consideration
behind D.R. 9-101(B), the ABA does not give it paramount importance. In fact, the Opinion
states that "the appearance of evil is only one of the underlying considerations . . . and is
probably not the most important reason for the creation and existence of the rule itself." Id. at
518. It later observes that "perhaps the least helpful of the . . . policy considerations. . . is
that of avoiding the appearance of impropriety." Id. at 519 n. 17. The ABA feels that "avoiding
even the appearance of professional impropriety" is too vague a standard to be helpful. Inquiry
19 criticizes Opinion 342 on this point, Inquiry 19 at 8, as the D.C. Ethics Committee regards
avoidance of the appearance of impropriety as the main purpose for D.R. 9-101(B). See note 22
infra and accompanying text.
21. See Inquiry 19 at 9:
[t]n analyzing whether conflicts of interest might exist as a lawyer transfers his
or her allegiance from a government agency to a private party, it is essential that we
bear in mind not only the fact of impropriety in a particular case, but also the
appearance that a course of conduct might have in the eyes of a public that is not
wholly trusting of lawyers and that may not appreciate sophisticated justifications of
practices that seem questionable.
An earlier version of Inquiry 19, reprinted in DIsTRIcr LAWYER, supra note 4, discussed
several reasons for giving particular attention to the appearance of impropriety. "First, when a
matter involving the administration of justice is at issue, the need to maintain public confidence
in the system is so great that the necessity to avoid even the appearance of impropriety becomes
a goal sought to be achieved, rather than simply avoiding the impropriety." Id. at 40. In
addition, the earlier version stated that through its focus on appearances "we hope to avoid the
necessity of asserting, and the extraordinary difficulty of proving in individual cases, that a
particular lawyer has in fact committed an impropriety." Id. Though omitted from the final
version of Inquiry 19 voted on by the D.C. Ethics Committee, these considerations remain
relevant and important.
22. Inquiry 19 at 7.
23. Inquiry 19 at 11-12.
24. Inquiry 19 at 17. Inquiry 19 lists several situations in which it might appear improper for
a former government attorney to handle a matter and questions whether these situations can be
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dismissed as inadequate and unworkable, 25 and the ABA is criticized for
creating through the screening procedure "an exception that appears
nowhere in the text of the Code of Professional Responsibility.' '26
resolved merely by disqualifying one attorney and not an entire firm. The areas include:
preservation of confidentiality, which Inquiry 19 dismisses as a relatively unimportant concern
for a government attorney, id. at 10-11; the improper appearance which may arise if it seems
that a former government attorney is using the information he gained while in public service for
the benefit of one client and not for the public at large, id. at 11-12; the suspicion that agency
lawyers may show some favoritism to former colleagues, id. at 12; the problem of switching
sides, id. at 1-13; the appearance that a private firm is hurting a government agency by hiring
away its key personnel, id. at 13; the appearance that government lawyers are "currying favor
for themselves" with private firms in order to win future employment, with the result that
government interests may be sacrificed for the potential advancement of the government
lawyer, id. at 14; the problem that a government lawyer might abuse governmental power by
commencing government action to obtain discovery or some other advantage over someone
who is a potential defendant in a private action that will be brought after the attorney leaves
government service, id.; and the fear that an attorney might instigate government action in
order to create a private employment opportunity for himself, either by defeating or preserving
the action he had initiated, id.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has issued a statement which questions whether
some of these problems are of sufficient substance to merit the absolute approach of Inquiry 19.
It questions "whether many members of the public at large actually believe that government
attorneys institute government action to obtain discovery or some other advantage against a
defendant in subsequent private litigation, or to create subsequent employment opportunities in
upholding or upsetting that action." Pitt Letter at 3. The Commission's view is that "[e]ven if
some members of the public do in fact harbor such suspicions, [it doubts] that even the
restrictions suggested in the Tentative Draft Opinion [of Inquiry 19] would assuage their
concerns." Id. It goes on to state that "the concern for maintaining confidentiality and avoiding
unfair advantage of one party over others exists in the private sector as well, and is addressed
by Canon 4 and the Disciplinary Rules promulgated thereunder." Id. at 4. The Commission
does acknowledge that "buying the government's best people" and "switching sides" are
matters that concern it. Id. at 3. The SEC's statement that "we are aware of only rare instances
involving private law firms engaging in this tactic," id., is an explicit acknowledgment that the
situation does occur and is a matter of some concern.
The D.C. Ethics Committee has indicated its feeling that to prevent some of the above
problems "[n]othing would suffice short of absolutely forbidding lawyers to move from govern-
ment service into private employment." Inquiry 19 at 15. It acknowledges that "[s]uch a rule
would, of course, impose a severe burden on lawyers in government service," id., and
recognizes that D.R. 9-101(B) failed to invoke this strict approach. Id. at 15-16, See note 7
supra. Inquiry 19 is, however, closely related to D.C. COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICs,
OPINIONS, No. 16, supra note 7, which interprets D.R. 9-101(B). While Opinion 16 uses logic
similar to that of Opinion 342, it seems to expand the definition of what is "substantial
responsibility" for a "matter" an attorney considered while a public employee within the terms
of the rule. Id. at 44. A stricter standard than that suggested by Opinion 342 clearly emerges.
When the expansion of D.R. 9-101(B) by Opinion 16 is viewed in the context of the absolute
reading of D.R. 5-105(D) favored by Inquiry 19, the Committee may effectively have estab-
lished a prohibition on movement from government service into private employment.
25. Inquiry 19 at 21.
26. Id. at 17. Inquiry 19 makes passing reference to D.R. 5-105(A)-(C), see note 14 supra,
stating that, in the opinion of the Ethics Committee, there is a conflict of interest for the
government lawyer who authorizes a waiver of D.R. 5-105(D) while there is no such conflict
when a private client gives a D.R. 5-105(C) consent. Inquiry 19 at 18 n.15. See notes 35-37 infra




It is clear that Opinion 342 is subject to criticism. The ABA has
attempted to mitigate the effects of a literal application of D.R. 5-105(D)
when on the face of the Code of Professional Responsibility no screening
procedure is authorized. The ABA argument that a rigid interpretation of
D.R. 5-105(D) will greatly harm government recruitment may be undercut
by the argument that the government is poorly served by the lawyer who
intends to work for the government for only a few years.27 Regardless of
ethical principles, the argument continues, there is always the danger that
such a lawyer will "shape his work for advantage in private practice ....
[T]he chief ethical standards of Government legal work are disinterestedness
and objectivity so far as one's own interests are concerned . . 2 Mobil-
ity in government employment, choice of competent counsel, and similar
considerations are important, 29 but as at least one court has stated,
the right of the public to counsel of its choice or the possibility of a
reduction of "both the economic mobility of employees and their
personal freedom to follow their own interests. . . " must be secon-
dary considerations to the paramount importance of "maintaining the
highest standards of professional conduct and the scrupulous administ-
ration of justice. '30
To some extent the standard of Canon 9 is an ethical absolute which
cannot be compromised; screening is such a compromise. In General
Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 31 the Second Circuit dealt with a D.R.
9-101(B) disqualification, stating that the court "must act with scrupulous
care to avoid any appearance of impropriety lest it taint both the public and
private segments of the legal profession.''32 The court concentrated on the
27. The SEC feels, however, that mobility in its ranks is a positive factor. Such mobility
constantly exposes the Commission to new ideas about the complicated problems it faces.
Additionally, "the departure of personnel helps enable the Commission to continue to offer one
of the important benefits that attracts and motivates persons contemplating serving in federal
agencies-the ability to exercise significant responsibility over matters of substance at an early
stage in one's professional career." Pitt Letter at 10. Further, the SEC states that the move-
ment of lawyers from private to public sectors and back both "serves the public interest by
insuring that individuals and entitites subject to federal regulation have an available source of
counsel that are knowledgeable in the complicated technical issues that can arise," id. at 10-11,
and "serves to enhance the private bar's appreciation of the nature and importance of the
concerns embodied in the federal securities laws." Id. at 11.
28. Fahy, Special Ethical Problems of Counsel for the Government, 33 FED. B.J. 331, 334
(1974).
29. See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text.
30. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir.
1975) (citations omitted).
31. 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).




negative impression the public might gain even if in fact no wrongdoing had
taken place. This concentration on the appearance of impropriety is the
hallmark of Inquiry 19. If one believes in a literal enforcement of Canon 9,
Inquiry 19's interpretation is almost unavoidable.
Aside from the consequences of a literal reading of D.R. 5-105(D), at
least two valid practical criticisms of the ABA's approach can be made.
While some of Inquiry 19's objections33 may not be sufficiently strong to
warrant rejection of screening as a means to prevent disqualification of an
entire law firm,34 those regarding potential conflicts of interest for present
agency personnel are serious. 35 A real conflict is created when personnel of
the former agency of the disqualified attorney are called on to approve
screening systems, as they must be conscious that they are setting a prece-
[O]ur duty . . is owed not only to the parties . . . but to the public as well.
These interests require this court to exercise its leadership to ensure that nothing, not
even the appearance of impropriety, is permitted to tarnish our judicial process. The
stature of the profession and the courts, and the esteem in which they are held, are
dependent upon the complete absence of even a semblance of improper conduct.
Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 575 (2d Cir. 1973).
33. The D.C. Ethics Committee lists five objections to the ABA's screening procedure: (I)
screening will not dissipate the suspicion that favoritism is being shown the law firm of the
former government attorney; (2) screening cannot effectively prevent the disqualified lawyer
from passing along agency secrets for the benefit of clients of his firm, and especially cannot
prevent the appearance that this sort of impropriety may be taking place; (3) screening will
affect neither the problem of the hiring away of key personnel nor the more compelling danger
that a lawyer will act during government service to ingratiate himself with a potential private
employer; (4) the government lawyers who are to pass judgment on a screening procedure are
themselves in a conflict of interest by doing so, as they may later seek private employment and
will prefer to tell prospective employers that even if D.R. 9-101(B) disqualifies them from a case
the law firm can still handle it; and (5) the screening procedure may itself lead to an inference of
impropriety due to the apparent conflict of interest mentioned in consideration (4). Inquiry 19 at
18-20.
A recent decision in the Trial Division of the United States Court of Claims similarly
rejected the Opinion 342 screening system. United States v. Kesselhaut, No. 166-74, (Ct. Cl.
Mar.29, 1976). In this case a motion to disqualify the law firm of the plaintiffs because one of
the firm members was formerly a government lawyer responsible for the issue involved in the
suit was filed, based on D.R. 9-101(B) and 5-101(D). Id., slip op. at 1-2. Judge Schwartz granted
the motion, and after first summarizing the arguments of Opinion 342 he turned to the views
expressed in Inquiry 19. He noted that there was no need for him to choose between the two
approaches since the government had refused to waive D.R. 5-105(D), but in extended dicta he
stated that he would not have accepted a waiver even had the government given one. He felt
that there would be a significant appearance of impropriety if waiver were allowed, as it would
appear that the former government lawyer had switched sides and "was taking advantage of
information gained in the government's service ....- Id., slip op. at 35. Judge Schwartz
concluded that no screening procedure could remove the appearance that an impropriety
existed, and thus that waiver was impermissible.
34. The reference is to objections (1)-(3) in note 33 supra. While they may present
problems, they do not appear so significant as to preclude the use of screening procedures
altogether, unless one accepts the basic view of Inquiry 19 that screening is impermissible per
se.
35. See objections (4) and (5) in note 33 supra.
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dent which will govern their own entrance into private practice.36 Screening
procedures may not only give rise to the inference that agency attorneys are
acting to protect their own futures, but they may also create an appearance
that agency personnel have given the required approval in order to help an
old friend. Even if in a particular case the agency lawyer acts without
considering his future, the public may perceive that a potential conflict
exists. The system will seem improper, and thus Canon 9 will be violated. It
will be extremely difficult to execute the screening procedures authorized by
Opinion 342 without leaving at least an appearance of impropriety in this
regard.
37
36. An example is provided by the refusal of the Federal Communications Commission to
disqualify the law firm of its former Chairman when he was disqualified from a case by D.R.
9-101(B). Green, Justice Agency, Law Finns Team Up to Oppose Lawyers' Ethics Plan on
Regulatory Conflicts, Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1976, at 32, col. 1. As Inquiry 19 points out, "each of
the Commissioners who rendered that decision has thereby decided, favorably to himself, the
rule that will govern his own cases when he returns to private practice." Inquiry 19 at 20. The
same situation will arise when young lawyers at an agency such as the Justice Department
approve a screening arrangement for a former colleage with knowledge that they themselves
will be in a similar position in a few years.
37. An additional criticism of the Opinion 342 screening procedure comes from the two
Maryland ethics opinions, note 4 supra. Both point out that the real party in interest is the
public, not the government (the Maryland case involved a rezoning proceeding). They conclude
that a government agency lacks the capacity to waive D.R. 5-105(D) and that there is no
practical way to gain "public" consent to such a waiver. MONTGOMERY COUNTY BAR ASs'N
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 19 supra note 4, at 6; MD. STATE BAR ASS'N
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Docket 77-10, supra note 4, at 13. The State Bar decision
reveals general disapproval of screening provisions and states its general agreement with the
views of Inquiry 19. Id. at 13-14.
One other potential problem with the screening procedure proposed by Opinion 342 is that
agency personnel may sometimes hesitate to approve a screening arrangement when in fact it is
proper. They may feel that if they approve the screening procedure and then lose the case they
will be criticized or even disciplined for dereliction of duty in granting a waiver. N.Y. CITY BAR
ASS'N COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 889, supra note 5.
Disapproval or approval of screening clearly should not turn on such considerations.
In recognition of the problems inherent in screening by government agencies, the Food and
Drug Administration has refused either to approve or disapprove requested waivers of D.R.5-
105(D), stating that "it believes there is a substantial question as to whether the Department
should participate in the administration of Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) by acting on requests for
such waivers." Letter from William H. Taft IV, General Counsel of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare to C. Russell Twist, Staff Liaison on the Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association (Dec. 23, 1976), at 3. The letter
also expresses
serious reservations as to whether the Department could effectively administer the
waiver procedure contemplated by Opinion 342. In particular, it is probably beyond
our capacity to make a case-by-case determination of the effectiveness of the screen-
ing measures adopted by a particular firm to isolate an individual lawyer from
participating in a matter and sharing in the fees attributable to it.
Id.
In contrast to the FDA's position, the SEC has questioned whether allowing present
agency personnel to pass on screening arrangements creates any real problem. It has stated that
"the likelihood that an attorney would perceive that his personal interest in a future determina-
tion of his own case would be served by any particular ruling is most remote, and certainly pales
by comparison to his interest in assuring that former government attorneys do not impair his
agency's efforts." Pitt Letter at 8. It further pointed out that this argument against the Opinion




While the ABA's screening procedure is not without its shortcomings,
the approach of Inquiry 19 seems unnecessarily harsh and to some extent
unrealistic. Opinion 342 recognizes in a practical way that a rigid applica-
tion of D.R. 5-105(D) will handicap government recruitment for legal
positions in government agencies, prevent many litigants from obtaining the
counsel of their choice, 38 and work grave hardships on many present or
former government lawyers. 39 Through an "excess of caution," Inquiry 19
may well hinder "the attainment of other important social interests," 40
including the need for a competent and mobile group of government attor-
neys. As Chief Judge Kaufman of the Second Circuit has observed, "[t]he
situation of the former government attorney or the attorney contemplating
government service is conducive to the overcautious approach. The restric-
tions placed upon his future career are so unclear and may be so sterilizing
that unless he is completely unwary he will hesitate before accepting
government employment." ' 41 The absolute approach of Inquiry 19 may
therefore cause more harm than good in pursuit of the prevention of all
conceivable violations of Canon 9.
Effect of Inquiry 19 on government employment. Perhaps the most
common objection to Inquiry 19, as indicated above, is that it will unduly
hamper the recruitment of lawyers to work in government. 4 This objection
must be approached from two directions, as the recruitment of two different
types of attorneys will be affected.43 One group is composed of young
serving in government." I'd. at 9. The SEC indicated a belief that government attorneys would
disqualify themselves from a particular decision if their personal interests prevented them from
acting objectively, much as private attorneys decide when to disqualify themselves from
particular cases. The Commission concluded that it "fail[ed] to understand how the operation
of the screening device differs . . . from other examples of persons who decide issues that
may, in the future, have an impact on their own personal careers-persons such as those
practicing lawyers who sit on Ethics Committees and interpret canons of ethics." Id.
Perhaps the Commission has missed two important points. First, lawyers who serve on
ethics committees are generally not former associates of those who come before the committee,
and if they are they usually disqualify themselves from the matter at issue. Second, a damaging
appearance of impropriety may arise even if the agency lawyer has in fact acted in a thoroughly
disinterested fashion.
38. [In addition, a]n inflexible extension of disqualification throughout the firm often
would- result in real hardship to a client if complete withdrawal of [already
undertaken] representation was mandated, because substantial work may have been
completed regarding specific litigation prior to the time the government employeejoined the partnership, or the client may have relied in the past on representation by
the firm.
Opinion 342 at 521.
39. See notes 10-I 1 supra and accompanying text.
40. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 657.
41. Id.
42. This criticism has been voiced by a number of federal agencies, the Federal Bar
Association, several law firms, and many individual attorneys. See notes 44-45 infra and
accompanying text.
43. See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra. A very interesting description which sets forth
numerous examples of both types of attorneys and their moves from private to public to private
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attorneys who graduate from law school and then enter government service.
Another group consists of older, more experienced lawyers who have spent
some years in private practice and then are asked to assume supervisory
positions in government with the knowledge that they will eventually return
to their former law firms.
The first group is the body whose recruitment is most likely to suffer
from any rigid application of D.R. 5-105(D). Many young lawyers take
government jobs with the expectation that they will leave the government
after a few years, using the expertise they gained while in government
service to obtain positions with private law firms. 4 An Inquiry 19 approach
will cause many law firms to lose interest in hiring such attorneys-if a firm
will have to drop or refuse a case that would generate substantial fees before
it can hire a young lawyer from a government agency, it will certainly
hesitate.45 When this becomes evident, "[y]oung, talented lawyers with
new ideas would be discouraged from working for the government and those
already there would find they had 'no place to go in the private sector.
' ,,46
sectors may be found in Jenkins, Working Both Sides of the Court, The Cozy Game Between
Federal Agencies and Washington Law Finns, STUDENT LAWYER 34 (Feb. 1977).
44. The practice has been described as follows for those coming directly from law school:
Many of them view government service as a valuable springboard to lucrative jobs in
private practice. They'll go to work for, say, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, develop some expertise in securities law, take a job with a law firm that deals in
SEC matters, and then appear before the agency on behalf of a corporate client they
once helped regulate.
Green, supra note 36, at col. I. It is difficult to determine exactly how many lawyers use this
"springboard" into private practice, but it seems especially common among firms in the
Washington, D.C. area which have substantial practices before federal agencies. Inquiry 19
states:
There is "a good deal of movement of both younger and older lawyers in Washington
between private practice and Government service." Some firms "freely permit and
encourage" members to accept offers of employment in Government service "with
the expectation (without any commitment) that they may some day return to the firm
Inquiry 19 at 3.
One former government contracting lawyer who now practices with a Washington firm
stated that in his case "after practicing for some years in the field in the Navy, he was of
interest only to private firms with such contract business on their books. When he left the
service, 'no other law firm would hire me. . . . I was 33 at the time. Who was going to hire you
if they have to take time to train you in an all-new specialty?' "Moskowitz, Can D.C. Lawyers
Cut the Ties that Bind?, JURIs DOCTOR 34, 35-36 (Sept. 1976).
45. At least one Washington law firm has ceased hiring attorneys from government agen-
cies pending the final disposition of the Inquiry 19 approach. Moskowitz, supra note 44, at
36-37.
46. Roderick M. Hills, Chairman of the S.E.C., in debate with Dean Monroe H. Freedman,
reported in The Washington Post, Oct. 7, 1976, § A, at 17, col. 3.
The SEC has indicated particular concern that the Inquiry 19 approach will seriously
handicap its functioning. As it points out, unlike some federal agencies which deal with matters
concerning only the government, "the Commission has a substantial private sector counterpart
which deals with securities questions . . . . [Tihe Commission's ability to attract quality
people depends to a large extent on the ability of those people to find subsequent employment
in the private sector." Pitt Letter at 9. It notes that the SEC seeks a three-year commitment
from the lawyers it hires, and that while some lawyers stay at the Commission much longer than
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A rigid application of D.R. 5-105(D) will give older attorneys pause
for thought as well. While the prestige and challenges accompanying the
positions they assume will lead some to accept government jobs, many may
hesitate when they consider the ramifications of an Inquiry 19 approach.
Since few supervisory positions are permanent, any appointee must realize
that he may eventually return to private practice. Lawyers with supervisory
authority over specialized fields of the law in government agencies may
frequently be charged with "substantial responsibility" over most if not all
the litigation in that field.4 7 The number of cases from which such an
the three years, "the financial and geographic constraints of service with the Commission,
combined with the natural desire of many talented individuals to vary their professional
experiences and accept new challenges, prompts the majority of attorneys serving at the
Commission to leave the Commission eventually to accept employment with private law firms,
the private sector, or the academic community." Id. at 10. The Commission concludes that it is
"realistic enough to know that, with respect to most new lawyers, if they cannot be assured that
they will not be burdered by unnecssssarily [sic] harsh limitations on their eventual subsequent
employment, they may not choose to forego the superior financial benefits they could com-
mand at some of the nation's law firms in favor of service with the Commission."Id.
It can be argued that the problem of firm reluctance to hire government attorneys under
Inquiry 19's approach has been exaggerated. Firms will lose individual cases, and not entire
clients, as a result of Inquiry 19's application. This is a situation with which a large law firm is
continually confronted in more typical conflict of interest cases (as where two of a firm's clients
become parties to the same legal dispute). If a firm is seriously interested in hiring a former
government attorney, it will do so despite the lost case, since the lower echelon government
lawyer may not have had substantial responsibility for enough cases seriously to jeopardize the
firm's practice. Additionally, many firms will be faced with the same problem, so that business
will merely be shifted from one firm to another and clients will not lack competent legal advice
in the competitive legal communities where such problems will ordinarily arise. However, one
must recognize that, unlike many conflict of interest situations, if a firm is disqualified by
Inquiry 19 it may have to drop a case it has handled for some time, suddenly leaving a client
without the counsel he had depended on for years. This is the result when a lawyer moves from
one firm to another, and it is tolerated in that situation. If it is extended to former government
attorneys as well it may have a devastating impact due to its range and frequency. Finally, many
firms may fail to be so rational in their attitudes and may simply refuse to hire former
government attorneys. Indeed, as pointed out in note 45 supra, one firm has already taken such
a view.
At least potentially, the Inquiry 19 approach may also extend beyond agency attorneys and
affect judicial clerks as well, thereby penalizing those who agree to serve a judge for a brief
period without expecting the experience to hamper future prospects for employment. See
Letter from John B. Jones, Jr. to the Legal Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar
(Oct. 14, 1976) at 2; Letter from Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering to the Legal Ethics Committee of
the District of Columbia Bar (Oct. 15, 1976) at 4-5. It may reasonably be argued that Inquiry 19
should not and does not apply to judical clerks, since they are not involved in the strategic
decisions of the case. Still, the ban might be extended to them, and if it were it would
discourage many law graduates from clerkship positions and thus deprive judges of valuable
assistance.
47. Scalia Letter at 2. D.R. 9-101(B) can have long-lasting effects on former agency chiefs.
One former agency chairman has said it was six years after he left the government before he
could represent clients before his former agency. Moskowitz, supra note 44, at 35. The SEC
position is that a former SEC Commissioner is considered responsible for every matter pending
at the Commission while he was there, including those resolved at the staff level. In addition,
"the Commission has taken the position that a former member has a lifetime ban precluding his
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attorney would be disqualified could be substantial, and if an agency chief
returned to a firm which specialized in the same area of law as the agency
where he worked, he might cripple the firm by making it unable to handle
any cases in its field of specialization. 48 For example, the Assistant Attorney
General for the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department would be
disqualified by D.R. 9-101(B) from private employment on all major gov-
ernment antitrust cases and investigations which were pending during his
years of service. "If, upon his departure from government, this disqualifica-
tion were automatically extended to all the partners of any firm which he
joined, the practical effect would be to prevent his joining any existing firm
with a substantial antitrust practice." 4 9 Such a result would certainly dis-
courage many distinguished lawyers from accepting appointments as cabinet
officials or agency chiefs. While the power and prestige of certain positions
may make some restrictions on a later career reasonable, 0 it must be
remembered that "[p]ublic service by experienced practitioners already
represents a substantial financial sacrifice during the years of government
employment; when there is added to this the narrowing or impairment of the
attorney's later career, the sacrifice becomes too much for most lawyers to
accept."" 1
The final group which will be significantly affected by Inquiry 19
includes those lawyers who either presently work for the government or
have done so in the past. Many of these lawyers expect eventually to enter
private practice, 2 but an Inquiry 19 approach may leave them permanently
trapped in government jobs.53
involvement in any matter that came up for a Commission vote and as to which the minutes do
not reflect the absence of the Commissioner, irrespective of whether the former Commissioner
may recall the matter." Pitt Letter at 6. The SEC Conduct Regulation is generally much stricter
than even D.R. 9-101(B). See 17 C.F.R. § 200.735-8 (1976). A disqualification thus can be a
lifetime matter, and if applied to an entire firm could devastate its securities practice.
48. A former General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board has estimated that
the Inquiry 19 approach would jeopardize between three and four hundred matters currently
being handled by the New York firm he joined. Moskowitz, supra note 44, at 35.
49. Scalia Letter at 2. John B. Jones, Jr., of Covington & Burling has described the
situation when his firm wished to take the head of the Antitrust Division into the partnership:
"As did virtually every other law firm in the country practicing antitrust law, we had at least
one case in our office in which this former Assistant Attorney General would be personally
barred from participating." Since it would have been unfair to the client to suddenly withdraw
from the case, "[a] blanket rule of imputation would have precluded this lawyer from coming
with us or with any other firm he would normally have contemplated joining." Letter from John
B. Jones, Jr. to the Legal Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar, supra note 46, at
1-2; Letter from John B. Jones, Jr. to Dean Monroe H. Freedman (May 24, 1976).
50. See note 54 infra.
51. Scalia Letter at 2.
52. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
53. These lawyers have expressed their concern over the possible result of an absolute
application of D.R. 5-105(D). The Federal Bar Association, a group of 15,000 present and
former government attorneys, held its annual meeting on September 18, 1976. After hearing
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Thus, the Inquiry 19 approach may greatly hamper government recuit-
ment at both staff and supervisory levels and may impose substantial
hardships on present and past government attorneys. Arguably, some sac-
rifice may properly be demanded of public servants, at least those with
positions of power and prestige.54 Still, though the appearance of profes-
Calvin J. Collier, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, speak out against Inquiry 19, the
F.B.A. passed a resolution favoring screening and opposing Inquiry 19. News from the Federal
Bar Association, No. 332 (Sept. 20, 1976).
It might be argued that the best way to solve the problem of present and former govern-
ment attorneys is to exempt them from the absolute application of D.R. 5-105(D) by use of some
form of a "grandfather clause." This would quiet their fears regarding their own careers and
apply the Inquiry 19 approach only to those who enter government service with knowledge of
the absolute application of D.R. 5-105(D) and the potential that once they enter the government
they may have difficulty leaving. This same "grandfather clause" could apply to judicial clerks
if the Inquiry 19 approach were extended to them. See note 46 supra. Such a clause would
prevent the injustice which otherwise would occur and would answer some of the criticisms
raised against Inquiry 19. However, it would also involve a compromise of the Inquiry 19
approach and thereby violate the basic spirit of a position that views any compromise of an
ethical principle as wrong. If the rule of absolute firm disqualification is correct it should apply
to all government attorneys-past, present or future. In addition, adoption of a grandfather
clause would only answer part of the criticism brought against Inquiry 19; the harm to
government recruitment and other injurious results would remain. The clause would, however,
avert the most unjust result of Inquiry 19, and seems to be the only fair way to treat present and
former government lawyers if the Inquiry's approach were adopted.
54. It is instructive to consider the requirements imposed by President Carter on federal
appointees in his Administration. His code of conduct, which derives in part from HOUSE
COMM. ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EXECUTIVE LErIS-
LATIVE AND JUDICIAL SALARIES, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-28 (Comm. Print 1976), will require
approximately two thousand upper-level appointees to sign letters of financial disclosure in
which they agree to file an itemized statement of assets and liabilities; to avoid participation in
any matter affecting either individuals or corporations "with which the appointee had financial
dealings in the year before assuming office"; to refrain from contacting for financial gain any
official of an agency or department in which the appointee has served for the year after he
leaves office; to have no financial dealings in any matters for which the appointee had
responsibility while in government service for two years after leaving the Administration
[apparently a less stringent version of D.R. 9-101(B) that will apply to both attorneys and
non-attorneys in government service]; and to file a periodic statement of the sources and
amounts of income received by the appointee for two years after leaving the Administration,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 17, 1977, at 50.
In addition to the above requirements, cabinet-level appointees must divest themselves of
any assets "where the nature of the holding or liability is such that it will be broadly affected by
government monetary and budgetary policies." Id. Appointees below the cabinet level must
divest themselves of holdings only if conflicts of interest might arise which would "seriously
impair the capability of the officer to perform" his responsibilities. Id.
President Carter himself has placed his family farm and peanut business in a blind trust
with close friend Charles Kirbo as trustee, has announced plans to sell his shares of common
stock, and will donate all royalties from his recent book and all income from a future book of his
speeches to an independent charitable foundation. Id.
Thus, the President has imposed heavy restrictions on his appointees. Some of these may
already be required by the Federal Conflict of Interest Law, 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1970), but others
are more expansive and reflect a feeling that government officials should conduct themselves in
an irreproachable fashion. The adoption of this approach may have been stimulated in part by
the recent report of the Commission on Executive, Legislative and Judicial Salaries which
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sional impropriety should be avoided whenever possible, there is much to
recommend the view that "[n]o opinion should be entered which would
unnecessarily restrict the government in recruiting personnel from private
practice of law or those in government from finding employment in their
profession outside of government." 55
Effect of Inquiry 19 on individual disqualification. An additional ob-
jection to the strict firm disqualification approach of Inquiry 19 is that it may
restrict the situations in which D.R. 9-101(B), governing disqualification of
individual attorneys, will be applied. 56 Application of D.R. 9-101(B) is
conditioned on a vague standard-the "substantial responsibility" test.
Lawyers and ethics groups may tend to restrict their views as to what
constitutes "substantial responsibility" for a case if application of the rule
would bar an entire firm from a case.57 While Inquiry 19 itself states that
D.R. 9-101(B) should be "broadly construed and strictly applied," 58 "there
will be inevitable difficulties in applying such broad standards for individual
disqualification when firm disqualification inevitably follows." 59 The strict
rule called for by Inquiry 19 may actually have the harmful effect of
discouraging the application of the individual disqualification rule in all but
the most flagrant situations and thus of increasing, rather than decreasing,
the instances when the public will suspect professional impropriety. 6°
condemned the " 'revolving-door' arrangements through which company executives, govern-
ment regulators, and contract negotiators pass freely, changing hats or uniforms as they go,
doing damage to public respect for Government." HOUSE COMM. ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL
SERVICE, supra at 26. President Carter is clearly concerned with the problems attacked by
Inquiry 19 and wishes to control all high-level government officials, both attorneys and non-
attorneys, in order to avoid any appearance of impropriety in the conduct of government
affairs. He recently proposed a new Ethics in Government Act which would apply to nearly
13,000 officials, Foreman, President Proposes Ethics Law to Bar Conflict of Interest, N.Y.
Times, May 4, 1977, § A at 1, col. 6, and apparently feels that strong sacrifices may be
demanded of those to whom the nation gives positions of great power and prestige. See also
H.R. Res. 287,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) ("the toughest financial code of ethics ever imposed
on a U.S. legislative body ... " TIME, Mar. 14, 1977, at 12); S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) (a corresponding code of ethics enacted by the Senate).
55. Letter from John B. Jones, Jr. to the Legal Ethics Committee of the District of
Columbia Bar, supra note 46.
56. See note 7 supra. A strict interpretation may have the "predictable tendency to
produce a parsimonious interpretation of the disciplinary rules governing individual disqualifi-
cation. It is a truism that where a sanction or restriction is unnecessarily severe, the rule
invoking it will be narrowly construed." Scalia Letter at 2.
57. See Scalia Letter at 2.
58. Inquiry 19 at 16.
59. Letter from Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering to the Legal Ethics Committee of the District
of Columbia Bar, supra note 46.
60. Automatic firm disqualification was recently rejected by the Internal Revenue Service
in the final report of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Professional Conduct of the Chief
Counsel, 41 Fed. Reg. 41106 (1976). In an excellent analysis of the background of and ap-
proaches to the issues examined in this Note, the Advisory Committee stated that it did "not
believe that the interests of the Government and of the public generally would be adequately
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In the final analysis, neither Opinion 342 nor Inquiry 19 is "right" or
"wrong." The situation requires a balancing of abstract ethical considera-
tions against practical realities. The prevention of even the slightest appear-
ance of professional impropriety is a worthy ideal, but on a practical level
the cost of achieving it is prohibitive. When a question such as this arises, a
court or ethics committee must
weigh for itself what those problems are, how real in the practical world
they are in fact, and whether a mechanical and didactic application of
the Code to all situations automatically might not be productive of more
harm than good, by requiring the client and the judicial system to
sacrifice more than the value of the presumed benefits. 61
A SUGGESTED RESOLUTION
All this is not to say that the objections raised by Inquiry 19 should be
ignored and Opinion 342 accepted as the proper resolution of the problem.
Even if one does not accept the ultimate solution embodied in Inquiry 19,62
much of its underlying reasoning deserves consideration. Inquiry 19 is
highly skeptical of the present screening systems, 63 and some changes in
these procedures are warranted. The Inquiry quite correctly points out the
inherent conflict of interest and resulting appearance of impropriety when
the decision on screening is made by agency personnel who may later wish
to be screened themselves.64 Some different system which can avoid this
flaw must be developed; the government agency should not have an absolute
right to approve or disapprove a lawyer's participation in any particular
case. 65 At least one government agency has recognized the inherent conflict
when it decides whether waiver is proper, and as a result has refused to do
SO.
6 6
Inquiry 19 mentions in passing the possibility of judicial approval of
screening procedures, but flatly rejects such a procedure as inconsistent with
served by any rule automatically and rigidly disqualifying all the partners and associates of a
former Government employee from a particular representation merely because the former
employee himself was disqualified from undertaking it." Id. at 41113.
61. International Electronics Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1293 (2d Cir. 1975).
62. One former Nader expert on the civil service, while acknowledging that Inquiry 19 may
lead many lawyers to reject government job offers, has said that it may "incline a different type
of person to apply for a job with the agency, someone with a kind of basic commitment to the
role of the agency." He feels that the FTC, for example, might then attract those who wish to
represent consumer interests rather than those who intend after a few years to use the expertise
gained at the FTC in fighting its decisions as members of private law firms. Moskowitz, supra
note 44, at 37.
63. See note 33 supra.
64. See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
65. An absolute veto has already been rejected by the New York City Bar Association. See
note 19 supra. If the agency should not have absolute veto power, neither should it alone
provide the approval needed for a waiver of D.R. 5-105(D).
66. See note 37 supra.
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its opposition to screening systems in general. 67 Nonetheless, the idea merits
further evaluation. If a judge, or even a special ethics committee, had the
final word on all screening arrangements, the apparent conflict of interest
would be gone. The agency would contribute to the decision, but only by
means of a recommendation for the judge to consider. A judge is an
appropriate person to approve screening procedures, as the judicial power
normally includes the regulation of attorneys and the preservation of respect
for the legal system. 68 There would be little inconvenience in allowing the
judge to make screening decisions in litigated matters, since he would
already be familiar with the facts of the cases before him. Matters not yet in
litigation and thus not before a judge could be screened by the ethics
committee of the local bar association. Since the ethics committee is also
called upon to maintain discipline in and respect for the legal profession and
the administration of justice, it would be an appropriate body to approve
participation in these cases. When a screening procedure comes before the
appropriate body for approval, the position of the government agency
involved should be ascertained, all other interested parties should present
their views,69 and the facts should be weighed to determine whether or not
disqualification is appropriate in the particular case. While relatively infor-
mal procedures might be proper at a hearing on such a matter, at least
minimal procedural protections should be provided. 70 In a close case, the
67. Inquiry 19 at 20 n.18.
68. The role of the judge as guardian of the profession's integrity is well established in our
system of justice. For example, the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a] judge should
take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional
conduct of which the judge may become aware." ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon
3(B)(3) (1972). The judge "should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before him," id.
Canon 3(A)(2), and should require proper conduct of the lawyers who practice before him. Id.
Canon 3(A)(3). Supervision of a screening procedure would simply be an extension of the
judicial duty to maintain propriety in the legal profession.
69. Such parties would include the disqualified attorney, his law firm, the party who
challenged representation in the matter, and anyone else with a valid interest in the proceeding.
70. The hearing on screening might be patterned after a disbarment proceeding, for which
all jurisdictions have made some provision and to which constitutional due process protections
apply. See Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505 (1873). An example of the procedure called for in
such a proceeding is that used in the District of Columbia. When a formal disciplinary
proceeding is held in the District, the attorney charged with misconduct is served with a copy of
the charges against him, files an answer to these charges, and if the pleadings indicate the
existence of any factual issues or if the respondent-attorney requests to be heard, a hearing is
held fifteen days after notice of the hearing is served on the attorney. At the hearing he is
entitled to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence.
Under some circumstances the attorney is entitled to reasonable discovery. After the hearing is
held, the hearing committee presents its recommendation to the Disciplinary Board of the D.C.
Bar, which makes the final decision. The attorney charged with misconduct may waive any or
all of these procedures. D.C. CT. App. BAR R. 11(8). Such a procedure will be particularly
appropriate when a bar association ethics committee handles some or all screening matters, as it
will already be familiar with its disbarment procedures.
Arguably, a screening hearing need not be so formal as a disbarment proceeding, since
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law firm should normally be disqualified; if the arrangement seems ques-
tionable to a judge, it will doubtless appear improper to the public at large.
When making his decision and balancing Canon 9 against the possible costs
of disqualification, the judge might at least ponder the contention that
an attorney need not be disqualified even when there is a reasonable
possibility of improper professional conduct. . . . [A] court must also
find that the likelihood of public suspicion of obloquy outweighs the
social interests which will be served by a lawyer's [or a law firm's]
continued participation in a particular case.71
While some might protest that the use of such a standard would permit
disqualification only in extreme cases, it must be remembered that the
disqualification of an entire law firm is itself an extreme remedy. 72
Whenever screening is an issue, an important consideration should be
when the case was brought to the law firm. A clear distinction should be
made between cases which were with the firm before the ex-government
attorney was hired and those which come in after the disqualified lawyer has
either joined the firm or announced his intention to do so. It is only in the
latter situation that it is likely to appear that a case was brought to the firm
because of the presence of a disqualified lawyer. In addition, the judge or
other body should consider whether the case comes from a long-established
client or from a new one, 73 since the same consideration applies, although to
a lesser degree. The judge should examine the situation very closely before
approving participation in the second situation; approval should be routine
disbarment is much more serious than a failure to approve screening; disbarment will complete-
ly divest the attorney of his livelihood while disapproval of screening will bar the law firm from
only one matter. Some of the requirements for disbarment hearings might be relaxed when
screening is involved, with the relevant body for each jurisdiction deciding which safeguards
are unnecessary after examining its disbarment procedures. The parties might often agree to
waive some or all of the procedural safeguards.
71. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 n.12 (5th Cir. 1976).
72. In addition to perfecting the procedures for approval of screening arrangements, more
formal safeguards for the segregation of fees must be developed if any are to be utilized at all.
Under Opinion 342, a firm is supposed to segregate the fee generated by a case from which a
former government attorney is barred so that the disqualified lawyer will be unable to share in
it. See text accompanying note 18 supra. While theoretically this appears to be a sound
solution, in fact it seems that such segregation is a hollow gesture. Though the disqualified
attorney may not share in the proceeds of the particular case, the fees from the matter will
nevertheless benefit his law firm. As a member of the firm, the lawyer benefits as well, either
directly or indirectly.
Perhaps the segregation of fees should be dropped as unworkable, and emphasis should be
placed on screening the disqualified attorney from participation on the work of the case. It is
possible that this will increase the appearance of impropriety, but it is doubtful. The main public
suspicion will be that a disqualified attorney helps his partners prepare the case, not that he
receives some fees from it. An ineffective fee segregation may be worse than none at all.
73. This point was forcefully made in the Letter from John B. Jones, Jr. to the Legal Ethics
Committee of the District of Columbia Bar, supra note 46, at 3. The Justice Department has
incorporated it into point (3) of its screening procedure, note 19 supra.
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only when the client was with the firm long before the disqualified lawyer
joined it. The screening body should also consider whether the particular
firm had the capacity to handle the type of case involved before the
disqualified attorney joined the firm; if it did not have that capacity, the
obvious inference is that the client retained the firm because of the presence
of the disqualified lawyer.
74
Realistically, there can be no complete solution to the problem pre-
sented by the two ethics opinions. Canon 9 needs to be preserved, yet if
strictly applied through D.R. 5-105(D) it may have devastating results. One
should not compromise a moral or ethical norm, yet some compromise is
imperative in the present situation. The ideals of Inquiry 19 must be
balanced against the effect of their absolute application, with the result that
some sort of screening procedure seems necessary. Still, screening violates
the basic spirit of the Inquiry 19 approach.
The basic problem is so inherently irreconcilable that to some extent
this Note "endeavors only to raise the problem, state some of the issues, and
offer certain suggested approaches." 75 By way of tentative conclusion, it
seems that the potential ill effects of an absolute application of D.R.
5-105(D) are so great that Inquiry 19 must be rejected. While one might
argue that the Inquiry 19 approach is proper for supervisory personnel even
if it is too harsh for lower-level government attorneys, the adverse effects of
such a rule on government recruitment and other matters are so substantial
that it should be held inapplicable even to them. Some form of screening
procedure must be permitted. That proposed by Opinion 342 fails to do
enough, but, coupled with procedures such as those proposed in this Note, it
can be made adequate to the task of preserving (or restoring) public confi-
dence in the integrity of the legal profession. Practicality requires that some
form of screening be permitted, since an absolute application of D.R.
5-105(D)'s firm disqualification rule leads to results so harsh as to be
counterproductive.
74. The SEC considers this factor before approving a screening arrangement. Pitt Letter at
75. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 669.
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